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Child custody and dependency cases require judges to decide
the fundamental rights of children and parents.' Although dis-
putes often arise at divorce, they also appear in many other types
of proceedings, including state-initiated actions against allegedly
abusive or neglectful parents, disputes over surrogacy contracts,
and other juvenile court proceedings.
Most courts decide disputes based on the "best interests of
the child," a standard that is ambiguous and sometimes results
in judicial abuse.2 Because this standard gives judges tremen-
dous discretion in deciding custody and dependency cases, an
informed public is crucial to serve as a check on the system.3
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' See, for example, Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 753 (1982) (recognizing the
"fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of
their child," an interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment). See also Smith v Organization of Foster Families, 431 US 816, 845 (1977) (recog-
nizing that natural families, but not foster families, have a "liberty interest in family
privacy," the source of which is "to be sought ... in intrinsic human rights").
2 For example, although custody awards are not supposed "to be used as punishment
for parental misconduct, some jurisdictions appear to have awarded custody for that
purpose." Lynn D. Wardle, Christopher L. Blakesley, and Jacqueline Y. Parker, 4 Contem-
porary Family Law § 39:07 at 36 (Callaghan, 1988), citing Schexnayder v Schexnayder,
371 S2d 769 (La 1979) (apparently endorsing punishment for past misconduct under the
guise of the best interest of the child standard). See also James C. Black and Donald J.
Cantor, Child Custody 3 (Columbia, 1989) (suggesting that some judges may grant custo-
dy exclusively to women under the notion that "women raise children and men work").
' See, for example, Robert Grant, Law and the Family v, 183-84 (Scribner's Sons,
1919). Judge Grant, a probate judge in Boston, included in his treatise on family law a
cogent description of his far-reaching judicial powers:
A Probate Judge who outlives you
May break your will-yes, tax it, too.
Concerning various other things,
His power outrivals that of kings:
If he decides you are insane,
All your remonstrances are in vain.
Your children, when you prove unfit,
Are whisked away by sovereign writ.
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Nonetheless, the right of the press to attend custody proceedings
has not been firmly established.'
Several lower courts have held that the press and public
have a qualified right of access to custody proceedings. Some of
these courts have granted the press access to such cases but
prohibited the disclosure of the identities of the children in-
volved. Other lower courts, however, have held that no right of
access exists and have closed courtroom doors to the press and
public. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue in the
context of custody proceedings. But in a recent series of cases,
the Supreme Court has recognized and gradually broadened the
First Amendment right of access to other judicial proceedings.
This Comment addresses whether the press has a First
Amendment right of access to child custody and dependency
cases. Part.I discusses the Supreme Court cases dealing with the
First Amendment right of access to criminal cases. Part II sum-
marizes the analyses of the lower courts determining access to
civil cases generally and custody and dependency cases in partic-
ular. Part III argues that, contrary to the strict construction
employed by certain courts, the constitutional objectives underly-
ing the Supreme Court's right-of-access decisions require that a
qualified right of access encompass child custody and dependency
cases. Finally, Part IV examines the scope of the right of access
to custody cases, focusing on the "qualified" nature of that right
and on the limitations courts may impose without violating the
right. This Comment argues that the press should always be able
to attend child custody proceedings, but under certain circum-
stances courts may condition this access on limited reporting
restrictions in order to protect the parties' privacy.
In short, it may be truly said
He has you living, has you dead.
The moral is-as on you trudge,
Propitiate the Probate Judge.
Id at v-vi.
" Under the First Amendment and the common law, the press and the public have
an equal right of access to the courts. See Webster Groves School District v Pulitzer
Publishing Co., 898 F2d 1371, 1374 n 3 (8th Cir 1990), citing Nixon v Warner Commu-
nications, Inc., 435 US 589, 610 (1978); Edward A Sherman Publishing Co. v Goldberg,
443 A2d 1252, 1258 (RI 1982). This Comment focuses on the First Amendment rights of
newspapers and other print media covering child custody and dependency proceedings; it
does not discuss the rights of broadcast media.
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I. SUPREME COURT RECOGNITION OF A FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHT OF ACCESS
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the ques-
tion of press access to court proceedings on four separate occa-
sions. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia, the Court held
that the public and press enjoy a First Amendment right to at-
tend criminal trials.5 The Richmond Newspapers decision arose
from a murder prosecution in which the trial court excluded the
public and press at the request of the defense and without objec-
tion from the prosecution. Pointing out that the judge failed to
consider less drastic measures, two newspaper reporters made a
motion to vacate the closure order. But the court denied the mo-
tion.6 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed.7
In a plurality opinion, the Court began its analysis of the
issue of access by considering the history of the criminal trial in
Anglo-American justice.' In tracing that history, the Court noted
that in England and the American colonies the "very nature of a
criminal trial was its openness to those who wished to attend."9
The plurality also noted that open trials serve several soci-
etal interests. First, open trials operate as a "nexus between
openness, fairness, and the perception of fairness" that ensures
that all parties are treated fairly, discourages perjury, and en-
hances public confidence in the judicial system.' Second, public
trials offer a "significant community therapeutic value": allowing
people to see justice done reassures them that society functions
properly and reduces the urge toward vigilantism." The Court
explained that "[tihe crucial prophylactic aspects of the adminis-
tration of justice cannot function in the dark; no community ca-
tharsis can occur if justice is 'done in a corner [or] in any covert
manner.'" ' Finally, openness educates the public about the judi-
6 448 US 555, 580 (1980) (plurality opinion). Seven members of the Court found
some First Amendment right of access, although there was no opinion in which more than
three Justices joined.
Id at 561.
7 Id at 581.
" Id at 564-69.
9 Id at 568.
l' Id at 569-70.
n Id at 570-72.
Id at 571, quoting the 1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey,
reprinted in Richard L. Perry, ed, Sources of Our Liberties: Documentary .Origins of
Individual Liberties in the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights 184, 188
(American Bar Foundation, 1959). The Richmond Newspapers Court explained:
A result considered untoward may undermine public confidence, and where the trial
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ciary and its administration." The Court stated:
People in an open society do not demand infallibility from
their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what
they are prohibited from observing. When a criminal trial is
conducted in the open, there is at least an opportunity both
for understanding the system in general and its workings in
a particular case ....
By educating the public, openness also serves to increase public
respect for the law. 5
Thus, relying on historical evidence and the societal benefits
of such a rule, the plurality held that a presumption of openness
attaches to criminal trials. 6 Noting the absence of an express
right of access in either the Constitution or the Bill of Rights, the
Court held that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in
the specific guarantees of the First Amendment,' which "share
a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on
matters relating to the functioning of government." 8 An order to
close a criminal trial would therefore require "an overriding in-
terest articulated in findings," but the judge, after making such
findings, may "in the interest of the fair administration of justice,
impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial."'9 Because
the trial court made no findings to support closure, did not in-
quire whether alternative measures could have achieved the
same results as the closure order, and failed to acknowledge a
First Amendment right of access, the Court reversed the closure
order.20
Two years after Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court
clarified and strengthened the First Amendment right of access
has been concealed from public view an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction
that the system at best has failed and at worst has been corrupted. To work effec-
tively, it is important that society's criminal process "satisfy the appearance of jus-
tice," and the appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing people to ob-
serve it.
448 US at 571-72, quoting Offutt v United States, 348 US 11, 14 (1954).
13 Richmond Newspapers, 448 US at 572.
14 Id.
' Id, citing John Henry Wigmore, 6 Evidence § 1834(2) at 438 (Little, Brown, 1976)
(James H. Chadbourne revision).
" Richmond Newspapers, 448 US at 573.
17 Id at 580.
"' Id at 575.
19 Id at 581 & n 18.
20 Id at 581.
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to criminal trials in Globe Newspaper Co. v Superior Court.21 In
Globe Newspaper, the Court held that it was unconstitutional to
require the closure of the criminal trials of alleged sex offenders
during the testimony of minor victims." Recognizing the holding
of the Richmond Newspapers plurality that the right of access to
criminal trials is not absolute, the Court stated that:
Where, as in the present case, the State attempts to deny
the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensi-
tive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessi-
tated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrow-
ly tailored to serve that interestY.
The Court determined that the state has a compelling interest in
"safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a mi-
nor.... . 24 It concluded, however, that this compelling interest
does not justify a mandatory closure rule because closure is not
always the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.'
Thus, after Globe Newspaper, courts must decide the issue of
press access to a criminal trial on a case-by-case basis.
The Supreme Court extended the First Amendment right of
access beyond the criminal trial itself to the process of jury selec-
tion in Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Court of California
("Press-Enterprise 1'). 27 In Press-Enterprise I, the trial court in a
rape and murder prosecution closed most of the six-week-long
voir dire proceedings. The court later refused to release any por-
tion of the court's voir dire transcript.2
In its analysis, the Supreme Court again considered two
factors. First, the court examined the history of the jury selection
process-tracing it from its inception before the Norman Con-
quest to the present-and cited evidence that the process has
been presumptively open with few exceptions. 9 Second, the
21 457 US 596 (1982).
2 Id at 600, 610-11.
2 Id at 606-07.
24 Id at 607.
2 Id at 607-09.
' Id at 608 & n 20. The Court noted with approval that "the plurality opinion in
Richmond Newspapers suggested that individualized determinations are always required
before the right of access may be denied.. .. "Id, citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 US at
581.
2 464 US 501 (1984).
28 Id at 503-04.
29 Id at 505-08.
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Court explained the societal benefits of openness, stating that its
value
lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can
have confidence that standards of fairness are being ob-
served; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend
gives assurance that established procedures are being fol-
lowed and that deviations will become known."0
Thus, "[cilosed proceedings, although not absolutely precluded,
must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs the value
of openness."3 ' To overcome the presumption of openness, the
trial court must articulate specific "findings that closure is essen-
tial to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest."32 Even when limited closure is essential, the
court may be required to release a transcript of the proceed-
ings." Thus, since the trial court's failure to consider alterna-
tives to full closure rendered its closure of the voir dire proceed-
ings unconstitutional, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment
and remanded the case.34
The most recent Supreme Court decision on the First
Amendment right of access, Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Court
("Press-Enterprise IF'), extended the right to preliminary hear-
ings.35 This case arose from a California magistrate's decision to
exclude the press and public from a forty-one-day preliminary
hearing conducted to determine whether the defendant had to
answer murder charges. As with the previous line of right-of-
access cases, the Court looked to "two complementary consider-
ations."" First, the Court examined the historical evidence and
determined that preliminary hearings were traditionally open to
the public.38 Second, the Court considered the virtues of public
access, concluding that the same values that led the Court to find
a right of access to criminal trials applied equally in the context
of preliminary proceedings."9 Thus, the Court held that a quali-
Id at 508.
31 Id at 509.
32 Id at 510.
" Id at 512.
'4 Id at 511, 513.
478 US 1 (1986).
Id at 3-5.
Id at 8.
Id at 10-11.
Id at 11-13. The Court emphasized that if a magistrate in a preliminary hearing
determines that probable cause exists, the accused is bound over for trial and-in a
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fled right of access attaches to preliminary hearings. The pro-
ceedings cannot be closed unless specific articulated findings
demonstrate that "closure is essential to preserve higher values
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."40
In summary, the Supreme Court has developed a two-part
test based on the historical tradition and societal benefits of
openness to determine whether a qualified right of access at-
taches to judicial proceedings. First, a court must determine
whether the proceeding has "historically been open to the press
and public."4 Second, the court must determine whether access
"plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particu-
lar process in question."42 If the judicial proceeding passes these
tests, a qualified First Amendment right of access attaches. The
right may be overcome only if "closure is essential to preserve
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."'
Moreover, the Supreme Court has never found a value so com-
pelling that it allows complete closure.
II. LOWER COURT RECOGNITION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO CIVIL, CHILD CUSTODY, AND
DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
Although the Supreme Court has not yet explicitly consid-
ered whether there is a right of access to noncriminal proceed-
ings, several appellate courts have found that the right extends
to civil cases.' These courts relied on the Supreme Court's own
majority of cases-pleads guilty. Thus, "the preliminary hearing is often the final and
most important step in the criminal proceeding." Id at 12. Further, "in many cases [it]
provides 'the sole occasion for public observation of the criminal justice system.'" Id,
quoting San Jose Mercury News v Municipal Court, 30 Cal 3d 498, 179 Cal Rptr 772, 780
(1982).
4 Press-Enterprise H, 478 US at 13-14, quoting Press.Enterprise I, 464 US at 510.
41 Press-Enterprise II, 478 US at 8.
42 Id.
Id at 13-14, quoting Press.Enterprise I, 464 US at 510.
See, for example, Westmoreland v CBS, 752 F2d 16, 23 (2d Cir 1984) ("[The First
Amendment does secure to the public and to the press a right of access to civil proceed-
ings ... ."); Publicker Industries, Inc. v Cohen, 733 F2d 1059, 1070-71 (3d Cir 1984) ("A
presumption of openness inheres in civil trials as in criminal trials."); In re Continental
Illinois Securities Litigation, 732 F2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir 1984) ("[Ihe policy reasons for
granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well."); Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v FTC, 710 F2d 1165, 1178 (6th Cir 1983) ("The Supreme
Court's analysis of the justifications for access to the criminal courtroom apply as well to
the civil trial."); Rushford v New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F2d 249, 253 (4th Cir 1988)
(The First Amendment right of access "should also apply to documents filed in connection
with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.").
1995] 863
The University of Chicago Law Review
historical analysis indicating that civil cases have always been
presumptively open.45 They also emphasized that concerns for
fairness, public confidence, and informed governance apply to
both the criminal and civil contexts.'
Although federal appellate courts have not yet addressed
whether a constitutional or common law right of access attaches
specifically to child custody and dependency proceedings, several
state courts have addressed the issue. In Barron v Florida
Freedom Newspapers, Inc., the Florida Supreme Court held that
state common law required a presumption of openness in all
court proceedings, including divorce cases.47 The court stated:
A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room
is public property. . .. There is no special perquisite of the
judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other insti-
tutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or cen-
sor events which transpire in proceedings before it.'
According to Barron, a court should order closure only when
necessary "to comply with established public policy set forth in
the constitution, statutes, rules, or case law"; "to protect trade
secrets"; "to protect a compelling governmental interest"; "to
obtain evidence to properly determine legal issues in a case"; or
to avoid "substantial injury" to innocent third parties or certain
common law or privacy rights of a party to the litigation.49 Fur-
ther, the closure order must be the least restrictive means neces-
sary to accomplish its purpose." Thus, the Florida courts ac-
knowledge both a common law and a constitutional right of ac-
4' See, for example, Publicker Industries, 733 F2d at 1068-69; Brown & Williamson
Tobacco, 710 F2d at 1178-79. In Richmond Newspapers, the plurality wrote that
"[wihether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a question not raised by
this case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal trials have been presump-
tively open." 448 US at 580 n 17. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, stated that
"the First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and the public a right of
access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal." Id at 599 (Stewart concurring).
" See, for example, Continental Illinois, 732 F2d at 1308-10; Brown & Williamson
Tobacco, 710 F2d at 1178-79.
47 531 S2d 113, 118-19 (Fla 1988).
Id at 116 (ellipsis in original), quoting Craig v Harney, 331 US 367, 374 (1947).
49 531 S2d at 118.
'o Id. See also M.R. v Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitation Services, 19
Media L Rptr (BNA) 1189, 1190 (Fla Cir Ct 1991) (allowing a newspaper access to the
court file in a child custody case, holding that the public's interest in knowing and evalu-
ating the state's actions in protecting children outweighed the privacy interests of the par-
ents and the child, and finding that the court could adequately protect any such privacy
interest by redacting from the fies the names of the individuals involved).
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cess to civil proceedings. Lower Florida courts have applied this
presumption of openness to child custody proceedings.5 '
Many state courts have applied the First Amendment analy-
sis outlined in Richmond Newspapers and its progeny to the
issue of the right of access to child custody and dependency pro-
ceedings. At least one court has found that under the Supreme
Court's two-part test focusing on the historical tradition and the
societal benefits of openness in a given context, such a right ex-
ists. In New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v J.B.,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that custody cases should be
open to the public and press.52 The court first found that "[t]he
history of civil jurisprudence, like that of criminal law, reveals a
tradition of public access."" The court stated that the historical
materials relied on by the plurality in Richmond Newspapers
applied to civil as well as criminal trials.' The New Jersey Su-
preme Court also found that, as with criminal cases, press access
to civil cases serves the First Amendment's "core purpose of as-
suring freedom of communication on matters relating to the func-
tioning of government... ."" The court concluded that this
right of access could be overcome only by an important state
interest.56
Conversely, other lower courts applying the Supreme Court's
two-part First Amendment analysis to child custody cases have
held that no presumptive right of access exists. 7 In In re T.R.,
"1 See, for example, M.R., 19 Media L Rptr (BNA) at 1190.
5 120 NJ 112, 576 A2d 261, 269-70 (1990). See also In re Chase, 112 Mise 2d 436,
446 NYS2d 1000, 1009 (Farn Ct 1982) (finding that the right of access extends to juvenile
delinquency proceedings).
576 A2d at 266, citing Publicker Industries, 733 F2d at 1068-70.
576 A2d at 266.
Id, quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 US at 575.
5 576 A2d at 267, 269. The court indicated that certain types of custody proceed-
ings-those initiated by the Division of Youth and Family Services ("DYFS") for termina-
tion of parental rights or for temporary custody-are presumptively closed. Id at 269-70.
Such a presumption was justified, the court stated, by the frequency with which DYFS
cases involve allegations of child abuse and by the compelling state interest in protecting
victims of child abuse from the trauma and embarrassment of testifying in an open court-
room. Id at 269. However, the court held that this presumption of closure was not abso-
lute: "Members of the public, including the press, must be free to make application to the
trial court to be permitted to attend DYFS proceedings." Id. Confronted with such an
application, "the court must balance the public's right of access to judicial proceedings
against the State's interest in protecting children from the possible detrimental effects of
revealing to the public allegations and evidence relating to parental neglect and abuse."
Id. Recognizing that J.B. did not involve any allegations of abuse, but rather related to
the father's mental health and capacity to carry out his duties as a parent, the court held
that press access was proper. Id at 270.
' See In re T.R., 52 Ohio St 3d 6, 556 NE2d 439, 448-50 (1990); San Bernardino
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for example, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that the Press-En-
terprise II test focusing on the historical tradition and societal
benefits of openness accurately defines the limits of constitution-
ally protected access to all court proceedings. 8 In applying this
test, the court first noted that the modern juvenile court system
did not exist at common law, "though it has roots in the common-
law doctrine of parens patriae, which made the courts of chancery
responsible for the protection of infants."59 Stating that juvenile
proceedings are typically informal, private, and based on an in-
quisitorial model rather than an adversarial one, the court noted
that juvenile proceedings have historically been closed to the
public. 0 Furthermore, the court found that public access to cus-
tody proceedings in juvenile court offered only limited societal
benefits. The court stated, "Custody disputes generally require
the courts to delve into the private relations of parents and chil-
dren. While curiosity may be incited by custody cases involving
bizarre facts or famous persons, this does not necessarily
translate into a significant positive public role."6 The court con-
cluded that a First Amendment right of access does not attach to
child custody proceedings.62 The court held that custody cases
are neither presumptively open nor presumptively closed. Rather,
a court must engage in a case-by-case analysis and restrict public
access if "it finds that: (1) there exists a reasonable and substan-
tial basis for believing that public access could harm the child or
endanger the fairness of the proceeding, and (2) the potential for
harm outweighs the benefits of public access."'
County Department of Public Social Services v Superior Court, 232 Cal App 3d 188, 283
Cal Rptr 332, 338-43 (1991); In re Katherine B., 189 AD2d 443, 596 NYS2d 847, 851
(1993). See also Edward A Sherman Publishing Co. v Goldberg, 443 A2d 1252, 1258 (RI
1982).
' 556 NE2d at 446 ("[Wle adopt this test and hold that the public's qualified right of
access attaches to those hearings and proceedings in all courts which have historically
been open to the public, and in which public access plays a significant positive role.").
'9 Id at 448. According to the court, the first juvenile court in Ohio was established in
1902. Id.
6o Id at 448-49. "'[All 50 states have statutes that provide in some way for
confidentiality' in juvenile proceedings." Id, quoting Smith v Daily Mail Publishing Co.,
443 US 97, 105 (1979)
61 T.R., 556 NE2d at 449-50.
2 Id at 450.
6 Id at 451.
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HI. THE CASE FOR A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
CHILD CUSTODY AND DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
Despite the different results reached by some lower courts,
proper application of the two-part test shows that the right of
access does indeed encompass custody and dependency cases.
First, divorce proceedings and juvenile courts, the two forums in
which judges typically make child custody determinations, have
been historically open to the public. Second, openness improves
custody proceedings because it serves to protect several impor-
tant societal interests.
A. The Historical Tradition of Openness
Contrary to the conclusions of some courts, an examination
of history reveals that child custody determinations have tradi-
tionally been open to the public. At least since the nineteenth
century, statutes in England and America have given divorce
courts jurisdiction over child custody disputes.'
An 1891 treatise on marriage and divorce states:
As a general rule, wherever the common law prevails, trials
in all causes are in open court, to which spectators are ad-
mitted. This method is regarded as required for the purity of
our judicial system, and as a precaution against possible
injustice. In reason and in the ordinary practice, it extends
to divorce causes.'
Several states enacted statutes codifying the common law rule
requiring open hearings. By 1931, for example, nineteen states
had statutes governing access to divorce proceedings."s Five ex-
pressly required, or were judicially construed to require, that all
divorce proceedings be open. 7 Virginia law stated that courts
' By 1900, United States courts were handing down more than 55,000 divorce
decrees each year, many of which included child custody determinations. Michael
Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth Century America
250-51 (North Carolina, 1985). See also Joel Prentiss Bishop, 2 Marriage and Divorce §
530 at 427 (Little, Brown, 4th ed 1864) (stating that custody determinations are made
during divorce suits by the divorce court in its discretion).
' Joel Prentiss Bishop, 2 Marriage, Divorce, and Separation § 674 at 278 (T.H. Flood,
1891) (footnotes omitted).
' Chester G. Vernier, 2 American Family Laws: A Comparative Study of the Family
Law of the Forty-eight American States, Alaska, the District of Columbia, and Hawaii (to
Jan. 1, 1931) § 85 at 132 (Stanford, 1932).
' Id. Hawaii law required that "no [divorce] case shall be heard except openly in the
public court-room." Hawaii Rev Laws § 2966 (Honolulu Star-Bulletin 1925), repealed by
1995]
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"may" require parties to give divorce testimony in open court.'
Eleven states required openness in most divorce proceedings and
permitted private hearings in exceptional cases only.69 Pennsyl-
vania permitted private proceedings "if necessary."0 Finally, the
only state that provided, in general, for private proceedings also
gave courts discretion to hold them publicly,7 and courts some-
times did open the proceedings to the public.72
A number of cases decided during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries reveal the importance courts placed on
openness. For example, in Hall v Hall, a 1916 divorce proceeding,
an Illinois court ruled that a state statute expressly requiring
Act of May 11, 1965, 1965 Hawaii Sess Laws 68, No 76. An Illinois statute required
"examination of witnesses in open court" in divorce cases in which the defendant defaults,
Ill Rev Stat ch 40, 9 (Callaghan 1927), recodified as amended at 750 ILCS 5/405 (Michie
1993), and was construed by the Illinois Court of Appeals to extend to contested cases as
well. Hall v Hall, 201 Ill App 589 (1916). Iowa law stated that "all [divorce] actions shall
be heard in open court...." Iowa Code § 10472 (1927), recodified as amended at Iowa
Code Ann § 598.8 (West 1981). Michigan provided that "the testimony of either party to [a
divorce] action shall be taken only in open court.... ." Mich Comp Laws § 12759 (1929),
repealed by Act of July 29, 1971, 1971 Mich Pub Acts 127, No 75. South Dakota's statute,
which stated that contested divorce cases "shall be had at a regular term of court," was
titled, "Trial in Public at Regular Term." SD Rev Code § 159 (Hipple 1919), repealed by
Act of Feb 7, 1945, 1945 SD Laws 54 ch 48.
' Va Code Ann § 5109 (Michie 1930), recodified as amended at Va Code Ann § 20-106
(Michie 1990).
' Vernier, 2 American Family Laws § 85 at 133 (cited in note 66). These states were
Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New York, Utah, Ver-
mont, and West Virginia. Id. The statutes, which varied from state to state, in general
gave the courts discretion to exclude the public under certain circumstances, such as
when the testimony was "scandalous or obscene" or "where the public interest require[d]."
Id. In addition, some state statutes imposed restrictions on which groups the courts could
exclude. See, for example, Ariz Rev Code Ann § 3821 (Bancroft-Whitney 1928), recodified
as amended at Ariz Rule Civ Proc 80(b) (In all Superior Court cases, including divorces,
"[w]hen a cause of a scandalous or obscene nature is to be tried, the court or referee may
exclude from the court room all minors whose presence is not necessary as parties or
witnesses."). In addition to the Arizona law, the Georgia, Idaho, Mississippi, Montana, Ne-
vada, New York, Vermont, and West Virginia statutes remain in effect with amendments.
See Ga Code Ann § 9-10-3 (Michie 1982); Idaho Rule Civ Pro 77(b); Miss Code Ann §§ 93-
5-17, 93-5-23 (Law Co-op 1994); Mont Code Ann § 3-1-313 (1993); Nev Rev Stat § 125.080
(1991); NY Domestic Rel Law § 235 (McKinney 1986); NY Judiciary Law § 4 (McKinney
1983); Vt Rule Fam Proc 4(g)(4); W Va Code Ann §§ 48-2-24, 48-2-25 (Michie 1992).
70 Act of May 2, 1929, 1929 Pa Laws 1237, No 430 § 27, suspended by Pa Rule Civ
Proc 1459 (1949), repealed by Divorce Code, 1980 Pa Laws 63, No 26 § 801.
7' Act of March 23, 1927, 35 Del Laws 564 ch 187 (1927), codified at Del Rev Code §
3514 (Star 1935), recodified as amended at 13 Del Code Ann § 1516(a) (Michie 1993) ("All
hearings and trials ... shall be had before the Court privately in Chambers; provided
that, for reasons appearing sufficient to the Court, the hearing and trial in any particular
case may be public.").
' See, for example, Lecates v Lecates, 38 Del 190, 190 A 294, 296 (Super Ct 1937)
(holding that a court properly exercised its discretion to open divorce proceedings to the
public, despite statute providing, in general, for private hearings).
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open divorce proceedings in default cases must extend to contest-
ed cases as well.73 Prior to the statute's enactment, courts could
hold divorce hearings in private. The court stated that "[tihis
practice gave rise to much scandal in divorce cases and gave to
Chicago the reputation of being a mecca for disgruntled and dis-
satisfied married people, where divorce was speedily accom-
plished."74 Thus, to rid the courts of the "scandal" associated
with private divorce proceedings, the court held that open hear-
ings were mandatory in divorce cases.75
Similarly, in Harkins v Harkins, the Supreme Court of Iowa
held that a state statute governing divorce proceedings made it
improper for a court to hear evidence behind closed doors.76 The
court stated, "The statute provides that all such actions shall be
heard in open court. And the court has no power to hear them
otherwise, and should never do so."" Additionally, in Lecates v
Lecates, the Delaware Supreme Court held that, despite a statute
providing in general for private divorce proceedings, a court could
properly order that divorce proceedings be held publicly.7" The
court emphasized that "court proceedings in private [seem] con-
trary to that conception of justice which has obtained for centu-
ries among English speaking people"79 and that "the truth would
better be discovered by an open hearing.""
Courts in Great Britain reported similar decisions, and at
least two British cases appear to have had some influence in the
United States. One such case, Scott v Scott,8 was cited by the
Delaware court in Lecates and was reported in detail in Professor
John Henry Wigmore's treatise on Anglo-American evidence
law.82 In Scott, a 1913 divorce action concerning a husband's
impotence, the court held that English courts had no power to
7 201 Ill App 589, 591-92 (1916).
74 Id at 590-91.
7 Id at 591.
76 99 NW 154, 154 (Iowa 1904).
77 Id (citation omitted). The court further stated that although a court may exclude
minors from divorce proceedings, "that the general public cannot be excluded from such
trials is clear." Id.
7" 38 Del 190, 190 A 294, 296 (Super Ct 1937).
79 Id at 295.
' Id at 296. See also Cross v Cross, 55 Mich 280, 21 NW 309, 310 (1884) (holding
that a party to a divorce suit shall be examined only in open court); Hobart v Hobart, 45
Iowa 501, 504 (1877) (holding that divorce actions must be publicly tried in open court).
' 1913 App Cas 414.
82 See Lecates, 190 A at 295; Wigmore, 6 Evidence § 1834(2) at 439-40 (cited in note
15) (1976 edition); John Henry Wigmore, 6 Evidence § 1834(2) at 335-36 (Little, Brown, 3d
ed 1940) (1940 edition).
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hear divorce cases in chambers.' A second British divorce case,
McPherson v McPherson,' also received prominent attention in
Wigmore's treatise.' The McPherson court held that a divorce
proceeding conducted in a judge's law library was improperly
closed.' Lord Blanesborough stated that a rule requiring open-
ness is essential to divorce cases because some judges may tend
to sympathize with parties requesting privacy:
[Tihere is, perhaps, no available way to correct these tenden-
cies more effectively than to require that the trial of these
cases shall always take place, and in the fullest sense, in
open court. This requirement must be insisted upon because
there is no class of case in which the desire of parties to
avoid publicity is more widespread. There is no class of case
in which in particular circumstances, it can be so clearly
demonstrated even to a judge that privacy in that instance
would be both harmless and merciful. 7
Moreover, the virtues of openness held special importance in
divorce suits involving custody determinations. Lord
Blanesborough stated that openness is especially important
where children are involved:
[T]he potential presence of the public almost necessarily
invests the proceedings with some degree of formality. And
formality is, perhaps, the only available substitute for the
solemnity by which, ideally at all events, such proceedings,
especially where the welfare of children is involved, should
be characterized. That potential presence is at least some
guarantee that there shall be a certain decorum of proce-
dure.88
The British rule requiring openness, reported extensively in a
treatise read widely in the United States and cited in at least one
American state decision, no doubt influenced United States
courts.
In summary, an examination of historical tradition indicates
that United States divorce proceedings, where custody determi-
8' 1913 App Cas at 417, 439-40, 445.
1936 App Cas 177 (PC 1935).
a' See Wigmore, 6 Evidence § 1834(2) at 440-41 (cited in note 15) (1976 edition);
Wigmore, 6 Evidence § 1834(2) at 336-37 (cited in note 82) (1940 edition).
6 1936 App Cas at 200-01.
SId at 201.
88 Id at 202.
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nations are typically made, have been largely open to the public.
Courts believed that open proceedings protected the public's in-
terest in maintaining the institution of marriage and the individ-
ual parties' interests in fairness, as well as the welfare of chil-
dren. Although some states have provided by statute89 or judi-
cial decision' that access to divorce proceedings may be denied,
most courts have rejected this view and continue to open divorce
cases to the public.9 ' Such courts have recognized that the pub-
lic has an interest in open courts and therefore that litigants "are
not entitled to a private court proceeding just because they are
required to use the judicial system."92
Because divorce courts do not make all custody decisions,
however, it is also necessary to investigate the history of juvenile
courts, which often decide custody in cases involving parental
abuse or neglect.93 Although the history of openness in juvenile
courts is not as strong as it is in divorce courts, courts have re-
cently come to recognize the benefits of an open courtroom.
The first state juvenile court system was founded in 1899 on
the belief that it was proper to rehabilitate rather than punish
children.94 Since their creation, juvenile courts have allowed
"varying degrees of public access." 5 Although some juvenile
' See, for example, Idaho Rule Civ Proc 77(b); Iowa Code Ann § 598.8 (West 1981);
NY Judiciary Law § 4 (McKinney 1983); Utah Code Ann § 78-7-4 (Michie 1992). For a
more complete list, see Wigmore, 6 Evidence § 1835(1) at 445-47 n 2 (cited in note 15).
' See, for example, English v McCrary, 328 S2d 257, 259-60 (Fla Dist Ct App 1976),
aff'd, 348 S2d 293 (Fla 1977).
91 See, for example, In re Keene Sentinel, 136 NH 121, 612 A2d 911, 916-17 (1992)
(holding that there is a presumption of openness to divorce proceedings and records);
Barron, 531 S2d at 116-19 (granting the press access to sealed divorce files based on a
common law right of access); George W. Prescott Publishing Co. v Register of Probate for
Norfolk County, 395 Mass 274, 479 NE2d 658, 663 (1985) (holding that in divorce
cases-at least those involving public officials--openness of court records is presumed
unless the overriding-interest standard of Press-Enterprise I is met).
92 Barron, 531 S2d at 119. See also Scott, 1913 App Cas at 438 (A court may not close
a divorce trial to the public merely because "the parties agree in being reluctant to have
their case tried with open doors."); Comment, The First Amendment Right of Access to
Civil Trials After Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 51 U Chi L Rev 286, 294-98,
310-13 (1984) (arguing that the First Amendment right of access extends to civil trials,
including divorce proceedings).
See, for example, T.R., 556 NE2d at 442.
04 The Illinois Juvenile Court Act established the nation's first statewide special court
for children. See Gilbert Cosulich, Juvenile Court Laws of the United States: Topical and
State by State Summaries of Their Main Provisions 7-8 (National Probation Association,
2d ed 1939); Grossberg, Governing the Hearth at 279 (cited in note 64); Note, Press Access
to the Juvenile Courtroom: Juvenile Anonymity and the First Amendment, 17 Colum J L &
Soc Probs 287, 290-92 (1982).
95 Note, The Public Right of Access to Juvenile Delinquency Hearings, 81 Mich L Rev
1540, 1552 (1983).
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courts have held their hearings in private," others have allowed
a substantial amount of public access.17 Many states have enact-
ed statutes permitting "interested persons" to observe juvenile
proceedings." The presence of "interested persons"-who may
include students, social workers, lawyers, and others unconnected
to the case at hand-substantially undermines the confidentiality
that closure aims to secure." Thus, the history of openness in
juvenile courts has been mixed; unlike divorce proceedings, there
is no single tradition of either openness or closure.
In the past few decades, with a growing awareness of certain
flaws in the juvenile court system'00 and of the virtues of open-
See id at 1552 n 72, citing Cosulich, Juvenile Court Laws of the United States at 50
(cited in note 94) (In 1939, juvenile courts in six states and the District of Columbia were
closed to the public, while juvenile courts in twenty-four states were permitted to exclude
the public.). See also Thomas Murphy, History of the Juvenile Court of Buffalo, in
Children's Courts in the United States: Their Origin, Development, and Results, HR Rep
No 701, 58th Cong, 2d Sess 10, 10 (1904) (Only the "defendants, the complainants, and
the court officers and witnesses" were permitted to attend trials in New York.); Ben B.
Lindsey, Additional Report on Methods and Results, in Children's Courts in the United
States: Their Origin, Development, and Results, HR Rep No 701, 58th Cong, 2d Sess 47,
80 (1904) (Some sessions of juvenile court were held in the judge's chambers, "the proba-
tion officer being present with his reports, also the parents and only those interested."); In
re J.S., 140 Vt 458, 438 A2d 1125, 1127 (1981) (denying public access to juvenile court
proceedings because, "[liar from a tradition of openness, juvenile proceedings are almost
invariably closed"); Smith v Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 US 97, 107 (1979) (Rehnquist
concurring) (stating that juvenile proceedings historically have been closed to the public).
' See Note, 81 Mich L Rev at 1552 n 72 (cited in note 95); Richard S. Tuthill, History
of the Children's Court in Chicago, in Children's Courts in the United States: Their
Origin, Development, and Results, HR Rep No 701, 58th Cong, 2d Sess 10, 10 (1904)
(juvenile hearings held in open court); Charlotte C. Eliot, The Change Wrought by the
Juvenile Probation System in St. Louis, in Children's Courts in the United States: Their
Origin, Development, and Results, HR Rep No 701, 58th Cong, 2d Sess 162, 162 (1904)
(observers permitted to attend the first session of the juvenile court in St. Louis).
00 See, for example, Minn Stat Ann § 260.155(1)(c) (West 1992 & Supp 1995); Ky Rev
Stat Ann § 208A.110(1) (Michie 1982); Cal Welfare & Institutions Code § 676(a) (West
1984 & Supp 1995).
0 See In re Chase, 112 Misc 2d 436, 446 NYS2d 1000, 1007 (Fam Ct 1982) ("Frequent
attendance by students, social-workers, lawyers, and observers of the court system indi-
cates that one need not be 'interested' in the child in order to qualify as an 'interested per-
son.'").
100 One commentator has written: "The [juvenile court] system's failure to control or
reform juveniles has caused many to advocate that it be abolished or drastically re-
formed." Note, Associated Press v. Bradshaw: The Right of Press Access Extended to
Juvenile Proceedings in South Dakota, 34 SD L Rev 738, 753 (1989). The Supreme Court
itself has noted the possibility of juvenile court misconduct: "Too often the juvenile court
judge falls far short of that stalwart, protective, and communicating figure the system
envisaged." McKeiver v Pennsylvania, 403 US 528, 544 (1970). The Court also noted that
"[a] recent study of juvenile court judges... revealed that half had not received under-
graduate degrees; a fifth had received no college education at all; a fifth were not mem-
bers of the bar." Id at 544 n 4 (ellipsis in original), quoting President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency
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ness in judicial proceedings in general,'0 ' some of the juvenile
courts that had previously favored closure have opened their
doors."l 2 Additionally, some states have enacted statutory provi-
sions creating a presumption of openness. In Washington, for
example, a statute provides that "[tihe general public and press
shall be permitted to attend any hearing unless the court, for
good cause, orders a particular hearing to be closed." 3 Similar-
ly, Michigan's statute provides for openness except under limited
circumstances,"' and in Illinois the juvenile courts are closed to
the general public, but open to "the news media and the vic-
tim."0 5 While these recent state statutes do not mandate open-
ness, they represent a trend in states to presume openness and
allow closure only in certain circumstances.
and Youth Crime 7 (US GPO, 1967). In addition, the Supreme Court has stated: "Al-
though the juvenile-court system had its genesis in the desire to provide a distinctive
procedure and setting to deal with the problems of youth, including those manifested by
antisocial conduct, our decisions in recent years have recognized that there is a gap
between the originally benign conception of the system and its realities." Breed v Jones,
421 US 519, 528 (1975).
' See Wigmore, 6 Evidence § 1835(2) at 450 (cited in note 15) ("No court of justice
can afford habitually to conduct its proceedings strictly in private.... The tendency to
undue privacy should be checked.").
1"1 For a discussion of the trend toward greater press access to juvenile courts, see
Paul R. Kfoury, Children Before the Court: Reflections on Legal Issues Affecting Minors 63-
65 (Butterworth, 2d ed 1991); Joseph B. Sanborn, The right to a public jury trial: a need
for today's juvenile court, 76 Judicature 230, 233 (1993). See also People v Williams, 97
Mise 2d 24, 410 NYS2d 978, 986 (County Ct 1978) (indicating that the protection of the
juvenile offender's anonymity "should be subordinated to the community's need to observe
the workings of its justice system ....").
103 Wash Rev Code Ann § 13.40.140(6) (West 1993).
14 The statute provides in part:
Upon motion of any party or victim, the court may close the hearing of a case
brought pursuant to this chapter to members of the general public during the testi-
mony of a child witness or victim if the court finds that closing the hearing is neces-
sary to protect the welfare of the child witness or victim.
Mich Comp Laws Ann § 712A.17(7) (West 1993).
1' 705 ILCS 405/1-5(6) (Michie 1993 & Supp 1994). The statute states:
The general public except for the news media and the victim shall be excluded from
any hearing and, except for the persons specified in this Section, only persons, in-
cluding representatives of agencies and associations, who in the opinion of the court
have a direct interest in the case or the work of the court shall be admitted to the
hearing.
Id. But see In re A Minor, 205 Ill App 3d 480, 563 NE2d 1069, 1074-75 (1990), aff'd, 149
Ill 2d 247, 595 NE2d 1052 (1992) (holding that juvenile proceedings are not presumptively
open and that the press has only a conditional right of access under the Illinois statute).
The court stated, "In our view, the language of section 1-5(6) suggests the legislature
intended to give trial courts control over persons admitted to juvenile court hearings." 563
NE2d at 1075.
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It is important to note that in two cases the Supreme Court
has found that proceedings have traditionally been open despite
the existence of some periods of closure. In Press-Enterprise II,
Chief Justice Burger relied on the 1807 trial of Aaron Burr to
conclude that preliminary hearings have been traditionally
open 6-even though historical evidence indicates that when
the framers drafted the First Amendment, preliminary hearings
were closed.1 7 In addition, the majority in Globe Newspaper ig-
nored "a long history of exclusion of the public from trials involv-
ing sexual assaults, particularly those against minors,"' and
found a long tradition of openness in criminal trials.0 9
These two cases indicate that when a proceeding's history is
ambiguous with respect to public and press access, periods of
openness should be given more weight than periods of closure.
That approach serves the First Amendment's underlying pur-
poses." ' Indeed, the checking value of the First Amendment
would be extinguished if the government and courts could pursue
"policies and practices that reduce the amount and quality of
information disseminated to the public... simply because they
serve the convenience, or embody the traditional prerogatives, of
the government.""'
B. How Access Can Improve Child Custody and Dependency
Proceedings
The second prong of the Press-Enterprise II test requires an
inquiry into the societal benefits of a right of access." It is
quite clear and widely acknowledged that access to custody and
dependency cases can play a significant role in the functioning
and improvement of both the judicial process and the government
as a whole. Indeed, as with criminal proceedings, public access to
106 478 US at 10.
107 See Gannett Co., Inc. v DePasquale, 443 US 368, 387 (1979); Note, Press-Enter-
prise, Inc. v. Superior Court of California for the County of Riverside, 24 Am Crim L Rev
379, 399 (1986); Casenote, Newspaper Wins Court Access but Loses by a Qualifying Mar-
gin, 8 Loyola Ent L J 337, 345-46 (1988).
108 457 US at 614 (Burger dissenting).
1 9 Id at 605.
... See Comment, 51 U Chi L Rev at 291 (cited in note 92); Note, 81 Mich L Rev at
1552 (cited in note 95).
... Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am Bar
Found Res J 521, 609. Professor Blasi further states that public officials who enjoy rela-
tive immunity from public skepticism and occupy positions of power can inflict serious
damage unless their behavior is regulated by public scrutiny. Id at 540-41.
,2 478 US at 11-13.
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custody and dependency cases is essential to at least six funda-
mental democratic interests."
First, public and press access to custody and dependency
proceedings promotes free discussion of governmental affairs by
educating and informing the public about the judicial system."'
Many courts have supported this proposition, one court noting
that access to custody cases "can promote informed public discus-
sion and lead to more intelligent responses to problems and is-
sues.""5 As a whole, the standards governing the intrusion of
the state into private family matters are still undefined."6 In
custody cases in particular, the need for public scrutiny is espe-
cially acute because "the best interest of the child standard is
inherently indeterminate.""7 Public access to juvenile pro-
ceedings is also important because many judges deciding custody
and dependency proceedings are elected officials: the public has a
right to observe and evaluate their performance in office so that
it can vote intelligently."'
Second, as in the criminal context, public and press access to
custody determinations provides assurance that the proceedings
are conducted fairly to all concerned."9 Even if all courts con-
" See Dan Paul and Richard J. Ovelmen, Access, in 1 Communications Law 1993 79,
98-99 (Practicing Law Institute, 1993).
114 See T.R., 556 NE2d at 450; In re N.H.B., 769 P2d 844, 849 (Utah App 1989); In re
Shortridge, 99 Cal 526, 34 P 227, 228-29 (1893); Wigmore, 6 Evidence § 1834(2) at 438
(cited in note 15); Barron, 531 S2d at 116. See also Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Free-
dom: The Constitutional Powers of the People 9, 19 (Harper, 1960) ("The freedom of mind
which befits the members of a self-governing society... can be increased.., by the
unhindered flow of accurate information....").
' T.R., 556 NE2d at 451. In T.R., the court stated that through access, "[tihe public
would be educated in the decision-making processes of the juvenile court." Id at 453. The
court in San Bernardino County Department of Public Social Services v Superior Court
made a similar point: "[T]he press can assist juvenile courts in becoming more effective
instruments of social rehabilitation by providing the public with greater knowledge of
juvenile court processes, procedures, and unmet needs." 232 Cal App 3d 188, 283 Cal Rptr
332, 345 (1991), quoting Brian W. v Superior Court, 20 Cal 3d 618, 143 Cal Rptr 717, 719
(1978). See also M.R. v Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitation Services, 19
Media L Rptr (BNA) 1189, 1190 (Fla Cir Ct 1991); In re Hill, 15 Media L Rptr (BNA)
1414, 1415 (Wash Super Ct 1988); Note, 34 SD L Rev at 755 (cited in note 100).
"r See Comment, 51 U Chi L Rev at 309 (cited in note 92), citing Michael Wald, State
Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 Stan
L Rev 985, 1000-01 (1975). In his article, Wald states that most state statutes define "ne-
glect" in broad and vague language, thereby increasing the likelihood of unnecessary or
harmful intervention into family life. Wald, 27 Stan L Rev at 1000-01.
"' Wardle, Blakesley, and Parker, 4 Contemporary Family Law § 39:06 at 33 (cited in
note 2) (footnote omitted). In addition, one commentator has argued that the public's igno-
rance about the juvenile justice system has contributed to the fiscal problems the system
faces. See Note, 81 Mich L Rev at 1550 (cited in note 95).
118 See T.R., 556 NE2d at 453.
11 See Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v Sirmons, 508 S2d 462, 464 (Fla Dist Ct
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ducted all custody proceedings fairly, if the public or the parties
perceived unfairness much would be lost. As one pair of authors
states:
[I]t is crucial that any custody proceeding not only be fair
but also be so perceived by the contestants. This is especially
necessary in matters of custody, not just because future
parenting by the "loser" may depend upon it, but also be-
cause violence and/or child snatching may well ensue with-
out it.
120
Without assurances that judges actually base their decisions on
the best interests of the child rather than on their hidden biases
or other improper factors, .the public cannot trust the quality of
custody proceedings. Access assures the public and the parties
themselves that the courts treat the children and parties to a
dispute fairly.
Third, openness serves the people's right to know what hap-
pens in their courts.' 1 The Supreme Court has noted repeated-
ly that "[a] trial is a public event. What transpires in the court
room is public property."1 22 Unless the proceedings of child cus-
tody cases are open to the public, the public will never under-
stand how judges make such determinations or know the com-
mon law as it develops. As a result, potential litigants will find
themselves disadvantaged because they are unable to understand
court rules and procedures. 123 Most fundamentally, even though
App 1987), aff'd, Barron v Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 S2d 113 (Fla 1988);
Wigmore, 6 Evidence § 1834(2) at 438 (cited in note 15).
'o Black and Cantor, Child Custody at 51 (cited in note 2).
121 In re Shortridge, 34 P at 228 ("In this country it is a first principle that the people
have the right to know what is done in their courts."). See also Franklyn S. Haiman,
Speech and Law in a Free Society 368-69 (Chicago, 1981):
Not only does the public need information to exercise its responsibilities of citizen-
ship, but, in a most fundamental sense, data in the hands of government belongs to
the public, having been collected through use of taxpayers' money and by the exercise
of authority derived from the people as a whole. For government officials to hold back
material from those to whom it belongs, without exceptionally good reason, is the
height of presumptuousness.
'2 Craig v Harney, 331 US 367, 374 (1947). See also In re Oliver, 333 US 257, 266-68
(1948) (describing "Itihe traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials"); Maryland
v Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 US 912, 920 (1950) (Frankfurter dissenting from denial
of certiorari) ("One of the demands of a democratic society is that the public should know
what goes on in courts by being told by the press, to the end that the public may judge
whether our system of criminal justice is fair and right."); Estes v Texas, 381 US 532, 541-
42 (1965) ("the public has the right to be informed as to what occurs in its courts").
12 See Cincinnati Post v Second District Court of Appeals, 65 Ohio St 3d 378, 604
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a particular child custody case may not directly affect the public
at large, all acts of the judiciary "relat[e] to the functioning of
government," a subject that the Supreme Court has stated lies at
the core of the expressly guaranteed freedoms of the First
Amendment.'
Fourth, access serves as a check on corrupt practices by
exposing the judicial process to public scrutiny. 5 The nature of
custody and dependency proceedings suggests a compelling need
to check the exercise of government power. Because child custody
determinations rely heavily on judicial discretion, "the 'compliant,
biased, or eccentric judge' [is] a particular hazard." 6 Further-
more, because appellate review of child custody cases is very lim-
ited, public scrutiny of the system takes on added importance as
a check against judicial misconduct. 2 7 Finally, because judges,
not juries, decide custody and dependency cases, the parties are
not able to appeal to the community conscience, as embodied in
the jury, to protect against government oppression. These fea-
tures of child custody and dependency proceedings, therefore,
suggest an especially strong need for openness.2'
NE2d 153, 155 (1992).
12 Richmond Newspapers, 448 US at 575.
12 See id at 569; Nebraska Press Ass'n v Stuart, 427 US 539, 559-60 (1976); Sheppard
v Maxwell, 384 US 333, 350 (1966). See also In re Chase, 112 Misc 2d 436, 446 NYS2d
1000, 1006 (Faro Ct 1982), quoting In re Gault, 387 US 1, 18 (1967) ("Juvenile Court
history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivat-
ed, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure."); Florida Freedom News-
papers, 508 S2d at 464 ("A strong and independent judiciary is the bulwark of a free
society. If there were no public access to proceedings before the trial judge, there would be
no safeguard for judicial independence nor any assurance ofjudicial integrity."); Wigmore,
6 Evidence § 1834(2) at 438 (cited in note 15).
' Note, 81 Mich L Rev at 1550-51 (cited in note 95), quoting Duncan v Louisiana,
391 US 145, 156 (1968).
12" Wardle, Blakesley, and Parker, 4 Contemporary Family Law § 39:10 at 68-69 (cited
in note 2). See also Jeff Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and
Appellate Courts, 18 Fain L Q 1, 39 (1984) (child custody cases are generally less likely to
be reversed on appeal than are civil and criminal cases). Such facts should make it less
likely that the losers in child custody cases will appeal at all.
12 To the extent the press fulfills its checking role, custody proceedings may become
less intimate and more formal, and therefore increased openness could undermine the
delicate relationship between the judge and a child who is the subject of the dispute. Such
increased formality, however, will enhance the integrity of the proceedings. See, for exam-
ple, Globe Newspaper, 457 US at 606 (public access to criminal trials enhances the quality
of the fact-finding process and fosters an appearance of fairness); Richmond Newspapers,
448 US at 569 (public access to criminal trials may discourage perjury, misconduct, and
biased decisions); Oliver, 333 US 270 n 24 (public trials may come to the attention of
witnesses unknown to the parties, who might come forward and give important testimo-
ny); Gault, 387 US at 25-29 (concluding that more formal proceedings are consistent with
the main goals of the juvenile court system).
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Fifth, access protects the right of parties involved in the
custody dispute to a fair proceeding. As in the context of criminal
trials, access to custody proceedings discourages perjury, miscon-
duct of the parties, and decisions based on bias or partiality. 9
As noted in Globe Newspaper, public presence at trials aids accu-
rate fact-finding." Additionally, publicity may alert parents in
general to their responsibilities toward their own children. 3'
Thus, openness may not harm the child in d dispute and may, in
fact, benefit the child, the parties to the dispute, and society.1 2
Finally, open courtrooms will lead lawyers, witnesses, and
judges to be more conscientious in the performance of their roles
because they will know that their conduct is subject to public
scrutiny."' Indeed, custody proceedings may call for heightened
public scrutiny because they make "extraordinary demands for
compassion and sensitivity on the judge, the parties and the
lawyers." 4
In summary, a right of access to custody cases is instrumen-
tal in improving child custody determinations. Access to custody
cases serves the same interests that have led courts to recognize
a right of access to criminal and civil proceedings.
' See'Richmond Newspapers, 448 US at 569; Wigmore, 6 Evidence § 1834(2) at 438
(cited in note 15). Additionally, "inasmuch as there is no potential panel of veniremen to
be tainted by undue publicity, open courtrooms present even less danger in juvenile
matters than in criminal prosecutions." Florida Publishing Co. v Morgan, 253 Ga 467, 322
SE2d 233, 238 (1984) (Weltner dissenting).
3 457 US at 606. See also Richmond Newspapers, 448 US at 596 (Brennan concur-
ring) ("Mistakes of fact in civil litigation may inflict costs upon others than the [par-
ties].").
131 See Note, 81 Mich L Rev at 1558 (cited in note 95).
112 Believing that favorable publicity would benefit the young girl at the center of the
dispute, one of the parties to the custody battle in T.R. wrote and distributed a press
release. 556 NE2d at 442-43. The court quoted the writer as saying about the young girl:
"She is never going to be harmed or have a hair on her head affected if millions of people
are looking out for her best interests.... ." Id at 454. See also Bill Dickhaut, In re T.R.:
Not in Front of the Children, Ky Children's Rts J 10, 20 (July 1991) (arguing that courts
must recognize that openness can serve, as well as harm, the best interests of the child,
since, "[ihf the stated goal of a custody suit is to find the best parent for the child, what
better way to expose the weaknesses and frailties of the prospective parents than under
the harsh glare of publicity?").
1 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v FTC, 710 F2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir 1983)
("In either the civil or the criminal courtroom, secrecy insulates the participants, masking
impropriety, obscuring incompetence, and concealing corruption."); Wigmore, 6 Evidence §
1834(2) at 438 (cited in note 15).
' English v McCrary, 328 S2d 257, 260 (Fla Dist Ct App 1976), aff'd, 348 S2d 293
(Fla 1977) (Smith concurring).
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IV. QUALIFYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
CHILD CUSTODY AND DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that any
First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings is quali-
fied rather than absolute. The right of access may be restricted in
certain cases to protect overriding interests.135 Such restric-
tions, however, must be (1) necessitated by a compelling govern-
mental interest; and (2) narrowly tailored to serve that inter-
est.13
6
This Section discusses what constitutes a compelling govern-
mental interest in child custody cases and argues that courts can
narrowly tailor restrictions to protect that interest by granting
the press "conditional access." In addition, this Section examines
the constitutionality of "conditional access" and the costs associ-
ated with it. Finally, it presents some factors courts should con-
sider when drawing the line between total and conditional access.
A. Compelling Governmental Interests and Narrowly Tailored
"Conditional Access"
Opponents of access might argue that, despite having a qual-
ified right of access, the press should nonetheless be prohibited
generally from attending custody cases because protecting the
privacy of children in all cases constitutes an overriding and
compelling governmental interest. Indeed, in some cases-such
as many of those involving child molestation-such a compelling
interest does in fact exist. In Globe Newspaper, the Supreme
Court stated that the government had a compelling interest in
"safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a mi-
nor" victim of sexual abuse.
37
However, not all custody cases involve child abuse, and even
among those that do, not all warrant closure. Rather, as the
Supreme Court stated in Globe Newspaper, the significance of a
child's privacy interest varies with the individual child and the
circumstances of the case. 3 ' For example, in child custody dis-
13 See, for example, Press.Enterprise I, 464 US at 509-10; Globe Newspaper, 457 US
at 606-07.
1 Globe Newspaper, 457 US at 606-07.
137 Id at 607.
138 Id at 607-09. The Court stated: "Among the factors to be weighed are the minor
victim's age, psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime, the de-
sires of the victim, and the interests of parents and relatives." Id at 608 (footnote omit-
ted).
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putes, the privacy interests of a six-year-old child who was sexu-
ally molested by her parents will differ from the privacy interests
of a sixteen-year-old child with high self-esteem, great maturity,
and upright parents. Because there are serious concerns for the
physical and psychological well-being of the first child, her priva-
cy interests are quite possibly compelling enough to warrant at
least some restrictions on press access; however, this is probably
not the case with the second child. Given such variance, a man-
datory rule requiring closure in all custody cases cannot be justi-
fied; instead, courts must determine on a case-by-case basis
whether closure is necessary to protect a particular child.
Any restrictions imposed on the press to protect a compelling
state interest must be narrowly tailored to serve that inter-
est.'39 As Globe Newspapers illustrates, blanket closure orders
should not be permitted where the circumstances of the particu-
lar case affect the significance of the state's interest. Thus, a
restriction is not narrowly tailored if it denies the press access to
all aspects of a single proceeding (such as an entire child abuse
trial) or if it denies the press access to one aspect of a large num-
ber of proceedings (such as all testimony by minors in cases in-
volving allegations of sexual abuse).
Some jurisdictions have met the "narrowly tailored" require-
ment by granting the press "conditional access" to custody pro-
ceedings. Under a "conditional access" agreement, a court may
grant the press access to child custody determinations provided
that the journalists will tailor their reporting in a particular
manner. For example, the court might allow members of the
press to attend only if they agree not to disclose the names or
publish photographs of the parties or witnesses. 40 This ap-
proach aims to protect the child's welfare by shielding her identi-
ty while still allowing the press to expose the public to the work-
ings of the system.''
9 Id at 606-07.
14 See, for example, In re A Minor, 149 Ill 2d 247, 595 NE2d 1052, 1052-53 (1992)
(reporter admitted to proceeding only after signing a pledge not to reveal the identities of
minor victims of abuse); In re Hughes County, 452 NW2d 128, 129-30 (SD 1990) (media
access to juvenile proceeding conditional on an agreement not to publish "the names,
pictures, place of residence or identity of any party involved").
.. See In re Chase, 112 Misc 2d 436, 446 NYS2d 1000, 1008 (Fam Ct 1982) ("Public
access to juvenile trials need not affect the confidentiality of records, nor, indeed, need the
anonymity of the juvenile be sacrificed.") (footnote omitted); A Minor, 595 NE2d at 1055
("Tis court and courts throughout this country in published opinions identify minors in
juvenile proceedings by their initials, or first name and an initial, so that their anonymity
may be preserved. The same policy would not diminish the role of the media.").
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B. "Conditional Access": Its Constitutionality and Costs
Some critics of "conditional access" argue that it amounts to
an unconstitutional prior restraint." The Supreme Court has
stated that prior restraints are not unconstitutional per se,'
but that the First Amendment provides "special protection"
against them.'" When faced with a potentially unconstitutional
prior restraint, courts must balance the various interests at is-
sue.
45
The Illinois Supreme Court conducted this sort of balancing
test in In re A Minor.48 In that case the court held that an or-
der prohibiting the press from disclosing the names of the chil-
dren was not an unconstitutional prior restraint.47 The court
weighed the children's privacy interest, as well as the state's in-
terest in protecting the children's privacy, against the press's
interest in full and unfettered disclosure of information. 48 The
court concluded that, in the particular circumstances of that case,
the children's privacy interest was compelling, but the press's
interest in disclosing the children's identities was not. The court
" See, for example, Comment, Delinquency Hearings and the First Amendment:
Reassessing Juvenile Court Confidentiality Upon the Demise of 'Conditional Access," 13
UC Davis L Rev 123, 145-48 (1979).
" Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v Conrad, 420 US 546, 558 (1975). See also Seattle
Times Co. v Rhinehart, 467 US 20 (1984), in which the Supreme Court upheld a court
order forbidding a newspaper from disseminating information obtained through pretrial
discovery in a civil proceeding. The Court stated that "even though the broad sweep of the
First Amendment seems to prohibit all restraints on free expression, this Court has
observed that '[fireedom of speech.., does not comprehend the right to speak on any
subject at any time.'" Id at 31 (ellipsis in original), quoting American Communications
Ass'n v Douds, 339 US 382, 394 (1950).
144 Nebraska Press Ass'n v Stuart, 427 US 539, 556 (1976).
145 See Landmark Communications, Inc. v Virginia, 435 US 829, 842-43 (1978) (The
court must "make its own inquiry into the imminence and magnitude of the danger said
to flow from the particular utterance and then to balance the character of the evil, as well
as its likelihood, against the need for free and unfettered expression. The possibility that
other measures will serve the State's interests should also be weighed.").
Several courts have addressed the issue of whether conditional access constitutes an
impermissible prior restraint and have concluded that it does not. See, for example, In re
A Minor, 149 1ll 2d 247, 595 NE2d 1052, 1055-57 (1992); In re Hughes County, 452 NW2d
128, 134 (SD 1990). For a more thorough analysis of whether orders prohibiting the press
from disclosing children's identities in juvenile proceedings constitute an unconstitutional
prior restraint, see Note, Conditional Access to Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Prior
Restraint or a Viable Solution?, 44 Wash U J Urban & Contemp L 135 (1993).
1 149 Ill 2d 247, 595 NE2d 1052 (1992).
14 Id at 1055. The case involved two proceedings "to provide shelter and care" for
minors abused by their parents. Id at 1052.
148 Id at 1056.
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held, therefore, that the order prohibiting the press from identify-
ing the children was constitutional. "9
While the First Amendment permits courts to restrict the
press in some cases by granting it only "conditional access," such
restrictions do not come without a cost. Supporters of the condi-
tional access approach argue that it adequately serves the inter-
ests of the press and public by allowing the press to report any-
thing that it thinks is important, except the identities of the
parties. In A Minor, the court stated that the newspaper
was free to report anything that it observed or heard, except
the identity of the minors .... [P]rohibiting the newspaper
from disclosing the minor victims' identities in no way inter-
feres with the newspaper's constitutional role of acting as a
conduit for the public in generating the free flow of ideas,
keeping the public informed of the workings of governmental
affairs, and checking abuses by public officials. 50
The court's statement, however, goes too far. A news report that
fails to provide the names of the people at center stage loses a
measure of credibility. As the Seventh Circuit has stated,
"[r]eporting the true facts about real people is necessary to 'obvi-
ate any impression that the problems raised in the [report] are
remote or hypothetical."""' Although conditional access may be
constitutional and effective in protecting both the interests of the
child and the interests of the press, courts should nonetheless
hesitate before imposing restrictions on the press because they
severely hamper its ability to fully inform the public about im-
portant matters.
C. Drawing the Line between Unconditional and Conditional
Access
Press access should not be restricted in cases involving rou-
tine custody disputes. On the other hand, restricted access may
be appropriate in many disputes involving allegations of child
sexual abuse. In a majority of such abuse cases, "conditional
Id at 1056-57.
15O Id at 1057.
... Haynes v Alfred A Knopf, Inc., 8 F3d 1222, 1233 (7th Cir 1993), quoting Gilbert v
Medical Economics Co., 665 F2d 305, 308 (10th Cir 1981). In Haynes, Chief Judge Posner
stated: "People who do not desire the limelight and do not deliberately choose a way of life
or course of conduct calculated to thrust them into it nevertheless have no legal right to
extinguish it if the experiences that have befallen them are newsworthy, even if they
would prefer that those experiences be kept private." 8 F3d at 1232.
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access" based on the press agreeing not to disclose the parties'
identities would be sufficient. Further restrictions might be nec-
essary, however, if the case involving sexual abuse also involved
a celebrity family or took place in a small community in which
nearly everyone knew each other. In such cases, the public would
probably be able to identify the parties even from news reports
that did not include their names. In those circumstances, the
court might offer the parties further protection by prohibiting the
press from covering the most sensitive parts of the proceed-
ing-such as when a child must testify about the abuse, or when
a judge asks a child if she would prefer to live with one parent
rather than the other.'52 In addition, if the child is particularly
young, immature, or emotionally scarred, the court might find it
necessary to further condition the press's access on an agreement
not to interview the child.
While right-of-access determinations necessarily involve case-
by-case analysis, these illustrations bring to light a few critical
factors courts should always keep in mind as they decide whether
to limit access to a child custody hearing. These factors include:
the child's age and level of maturity, the nature of the hearing,
whether sexual abuse is at issue, and the potential for future
physical or psychological harm to the child.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional objectives that led the Supreme Court to
establish a right of access to criminal proceedings apply with
equal force to child custody and dependency cases. The right of
access may be limited only by restrictions that are narrowly tai-
lored to protect a child's privacy interest. In such cases, a court
may grant the press conditional access by allowing coverage of
the proceeding but prohibiting the press from disclosing the iden-
tity of the child, or perhaps a court may exclude the press from
one aspect of a particular proceeding. Access promotes informed
public discussion, fairness, and the appearance of fairness, and it
12 See generally Ira Mark Ellman, Paul M. Kurtz, and Katharine T. Bartlett, Family
Law: Cases, Texts, Problems 541-42 (Michie, 2d ed 1991). Some statutes require that a
transcript of such in camera interviews be made a part of the record unless waived by the
parties. See, for example, Minn Stat Ann § 518.166 (West 1990). See also Smith v Smith,
425 NW2d 854, 858 (Minn 1988) ("trial court erred by failing to make a record" of in
camera interviews of children); Williams v Cole, 590 SW2d 908 (Mo 1979) ("[1f the court
exercises its discretion and interviews the children in chambers without causing a record
to be made, error is presumed."). Other statutes do not require a record of the interview.
See, for example, Ohio Rev Code Ann § 3109.04(B) (Banks-Baldwin 1993).
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leads to more intelligent responses to problems and issues involv-
ing custody proceedings. Access benefits children by improving
the system that decides their fate.
